of negotiations for repeated ceasefires, and for the provision of peacekeeping forces to separate combatants.
2 Today it faces a new crisis engendered by the US-Iraq war, a crisis that may endang rnational collaps er the institution's global influence as well.
In much of this post World War II history the United States supported a strong UN role, and thus kept the institution at the center of Middle East politics. Yet, in the spiraling events since September 11, 2001 that have brought the world fresh Middle East warfare, charges of the UN's potential "irrelevance" in the region have emanated regularly from Washington. As the Madrid Summit were all undertaken with little regard for UN involvement. In the case of the talks, which the first George Bush convened in the wake of victory over Saddam Hussein in Kuwait⎯a UN authorized operation⎯the United Nations was allowed only "observer" status.
For the most part, these two histories of Middle East engagement-UN and Americanhave been quite distinct, separate threads based on divergent analyses, sometimes moving in tandem, often at cross purposes. Particularly as the United Nations majority came to e non-aligned states, and as the United States increasingly was perceived as Israel's sole supporter, the US-UN relationship on Middle East issues became an antagonistic one.
With the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of the first Gulf War, however, the two strands merged by common consent of administrations in Washington and the Security Council in New York. The marriage opened tantalizing prospects for a comprehensive peace in the region, but it also put the United Nations in the high-risk position of being perceived as little more than an instrument of American foreign policy. Baker undertook a concerted diplomatic effort to achieve a comprehensive Middle East peace.
When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the sense of inevitable progress was shattered. Nonetheless, the UN Security Council, vigorously encouraged by the United States, passed tough resolutions demanding the withdrawal of Iraqi forces and the reestablishment of the sovereignty of Kuwait. 6 In president Bush's estimation, the crisis provided an opportunity to forge a partnership of the "P5" (the permanent members of the Security Council) and to use the United Nations in the service of his announced "New World Order." The UN could provide the architecture through which legitimacy for US actions and "burdensharing" could be achieved. The world body could also provide post-conf suggest that it will not be easy to exclude the United Nations from Middle East affairs for the foreseeable future, particularly given the ap 
